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Abstract 
 
This article reviews the achievements and limitations of the federal administrations led by 
the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Brazilian Workers’ Party, PT), focusing on the Party’s 
pragmatic political and economic strategy, or its choice of what we call the ‘path of least 
resistance’. Under favourable external circumstances, pragmatism helped to secure short-
term political stability, boosted growth, and supported an unprecedented distribution of 
income. However, pragmatism also implied that the PT had to accommodate rather than 
transform the constraints to growth in Brazil, and that political stability would entail 
unwieldy alliances preventing deeper reforms. When it was confronted with deteriorating 
global economic conditions and increasingly ineffectual economic policies, the PT’s 
accommodating strategy immobilised the party, facilitated the dissolution of its base of 
support, and expedited its ouster from power. The Brazilian experience suggests that 
political pragmatism can, within limits, support progressive economic change, but the 
outcomes depend heavily on the external circumstances and the stability of the political 
coalitions supporting the administration. 
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Introduction 
 
Global conditions were exceptionally supportive of economic development in the early 
2000s, because of the combined impact of the ‘great moderation’ in the USA, relative 
prosperity in the EU, and rapid growth in China. Most low and middle-income economies 
benefitted from the high export prices associated with the so-called ‘commodity 
supercycle’, and from abundant inflows of capital (Saad-Filho 2013).  
 
Those conditions facilitated the implementation of pragmatic and non-confrontational 
reformist policies in the administrations led by the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Brazilian 
Workers’ Party – PT), that is, the pursuit of progressive outcomes through a ‘path of least 
resistance’. This strategy included the commitment to the ‘rules of the game’, preserving 
the Constitution, and redistributing income flows at the margin through transfer 
programmes and improvements in the labour markets, while leaving unchallenged the 
(highly unequal) distribution of assets and avoiding extra-institutional mobilisation, 
ideological confrontation or appeals to class-based politics. 
 
Under favourable external circumstances, the PT’s path of least resistance supported an 
unprecedented virtuous cycle including growth, distribution and domestic political 
stability. However, this strategy inevitably failed to transform the system of accumulation 
and the long-term constraints to growth in Brazil; in the medium-term, its continuing 
viability depended on conditions that were either ignored or taken for granted. Their 
cumulative failure dissolved the traditional base of support of the PT, disabled the party 
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at a crucial historical juncture, and facilitated the overthrow of President Dilma Rousseff, 
in 2016. 
 
This argument is developed in five sections. This introduction is the first. The second 
reviews the ‘success story’ of the 2000s, through an examination of the political and 
economic dynamics in Brazil and the drivers of growth and distribution during that 
period. The article focuses on the minimum wage and the federal income transfer 
programmes (especially the conditional cash transfers and the expansion of public 
pensions and other benefits), and the relaxation of the balance-of-payments constraint to 
growth, because of high commodity prices and abundant international liquidity during 
that period. The third examines the macroeconomic limitations to the PT’s strategy, 
focusing on the inadequacies in the Brazilian industrial structure, the deterioration of the 
country’s insertion into the global economy, the emergence of large current account 
deficits, rising inflation, and the diminishing scope for distribution. Those limitations 
suggest that pragmatic economic strategies are intrinsically limited, and their limitations 
would eventually undermine the PT’s sources of political support. The fourth explains the 
PT’s continuing attachment to a pragmatic strategy even as the political and economic 
crises spiralled out of control. This is illustrated through four moments, starting from the 
failure of the ‘new economic matrix’ in 2011-2013; the government’s disregard for the 
mass protests in June 2013; the economic policy turnaround after the 2014 elections and, 
finally, the PT’s decision to follow a non-confrontational strategy even as President 
Dilma Rousseff was being impeached. The fifth section concludes. 
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The Economic Upswing 
 
The dominant system of accumulation and strategy of development in Brazil was 
transformed from import-substituting industrialisation to neoliberalism, between 1988 
and 1994. This systemic change was achieved through institutional shifts and policy 
reforms including the liberalisation of trade, finance and capital flows, changes in labour 
law and the patterns of employment, and the stabilisation of the currency through the 
‘real plan’ (named after the country’s new currency; see Saad-Filho and Mollo 2001). 
Neoliberalism promoted a modality of accumulation based on the financialisation of 
production, social reproduction and the state, and much greater transnational integration 
of Brazilian capital through FDI, mergers and acquisitions, portfolio investment and 
participation in global value chains. In the new policy regime, the manipulation of 
interest rates became centrally important for inflation control, exchange rate stability, 
balance of payments equilibrium and the financing of the state.  
 
The macroeconomic consequences of neoliberalism included markedly lower GDP 
growth rates, deindustrialisation and reprimarisation of the economy, higher 
unemployment and precarisation of labour, and a regressive shift in the distribution of 
income. The fragilities of this system of accumulation help to explain the 1999 exchange 
rate crisis and the loss of political legitimacy of neoliberalism (Arestis and Saad-Filho 
2007). They also contributed directly to the election of PT candidate Luís Inácio Lula da 
Silva to the Presidency, in 2002. Lula’s election brought high expectations for a new 
policy compact securing higher growth rates and lower inequality. Those outcomes were 
achieved, at least in part and with significant drawbacks, as is shown below.  
This is the accepted version of an article published by Sage in Latin American Perspectives, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X18805093 
5 
 
 
Brazil experienced a growth surge during the Lula administrations (2003-2006, 2007-
2010; see Table 1). This surge can be divided into two phases. The initial uptick was 
driven by the devaluation of the Real, in 1999, the global economic boom, in the early 
2000s, and the expansion in Chinese demand for primary commodities. They contributed 
to a significant increase in the country’s earnings from trade, as the volume of exports 
increased by 64 per cent, and prices by 24 per cent, between 2001 and 2005.1 Export 
growth accounts for 43.5 per cent of the increase in aggregate demand between 2003 and 
2005. This was the main factor lifting the GDP growth rate from 1.1 per cent, in 2003, to 
5.8 per cent, in 2004. The global boom also brought to Brazil rising volumes of FDI and 
portfolio flows: net inflows were around US$15 billion in 2003 and 2004, and reached 
US$116 billion in 2010; they remained around US$80-100 billion per year in the 
following period (see Figure 1). 
 
Table 1 – Brazil: Contribution of the sources of demand to the GDP growth rate (net of 
their impact on imports). 
 
Private 
consumption 
(% of total) 
Government 
consumption 
(% of total) 
Investment 
(% of total) 
Exports 
(% of total) 
GDP growth 
rate 
(% of total) 
2003-2005 
1.3 
(40%) 
0.5 
(14%) 
0.1 
(3%) 
1.5 
(44%) 
3.4 
(100%) 
2006-2011 
2.6 
(59%) 
0.5 
(12%) 
1.0 
(23%) 
0.2 
(6%) 
4.4 
(100%) 
2012-2015 
0.6 
(198%) 
0.2 
(63%) 
-0.7 
(-230%) 
0.2 
(69%) 
0.3 
(100%) 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on Souza Júnior (2016). 
 
Figure 1 Brazil: Select balance of payments accounts, 2001-2015 (US$ billion) 
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Source: Ipeadata.gov.br. BPM6 methodology. 
 
The growth impulse due to rising exports was limited by the government’s decision to 
maintain the neoliberal ‘policy tripod’ introduced by the previous administration, 
including contractionary fiscal and monetary policies, inflation targeting and floating 
exchange rates, and liberalised capital flows. Lula’s commitment to economic orthodoxy 
was reinforced by the appointment of a prominent banker and member of the opposition 
Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social Democratic Party, PSDB) for 
the presidency of the Central Bank. The government also cut fiscal spending by 1 per 
cent of GDP, and raised the primary fiscal surplus above the target agreed with the IMF 
(3.75 per cent of GDP), to reach 4.2 per cent, in 2004, and 4.4 per cent, in 2005. These 
decisions were grounded on the PT’s determination to appease the opposition, minimise 
capital flight and avoid confrontations with finance, industry, or other powerful groups 
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committed to neoliberalism. Given these limitations, economic growth could resume only 
through a fortuitous increase in exports. 
 
The tax revenues drawn from the growth in exports allowed the administration to expand 
its transfer programmes and start lifting the minimum wage, setting off a cycle of growth 
(Corrêa and Santos 2013). Nevertheless, the contractionary macroeconomic policies 
associated with the ‘tripod’ limited GDP growth to 3.2 per cent in 2005. This setback 
eventually convinced the administration that orthodox policies could not deliver sustained 
growth, despite the favourable external conditions. 
 
In his second administration, Lula introduced a policy inflection including selected 
neodevelopmentalist initiatives in addition to the neoliberal ‘tripod’ (Morais and Saad-
Filho 2012). Neodevelopmentalism draws upon heterodox economic traditions, especially 
the evolutionary, post-Keynesian and Latin American structuralist schools. This 
framework considers that the ‘old’ Latin American developmentalism, that was 
associated with the process of import-substituting industrialisation (ISI), ultimately failed 
because it did not support the internalisation of the sources of technical change. ISI was 
also limited by its tendency to increase the concentration of income and wealth.  
 
Against these limitations, the emerging neodevelopmentalist tradition suggest that 
government policies should aim beyond the mainstream goal of monetary stability and 
focus, instead, on a broader set of distributive and growth-promoting fiscal, financial, 
monetary, exchange rate, labour and social policies (Bresser-Pereira 2005). For example, 
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for Sicsú, Paula and Michel (2005: xxxv), the four main theses of neodevelopmentalism 
are that:  
 
(1) there is no strong market without a strong state; (2) there will be no sustained 
growth [...] without the strengthening of the market and the implementation of 
adequate macroeconomic policies; (3) strong markets and states will only be built 
by a national development project that conciliates growth [...] and social equity; 
and (4) it is not possible to [reduce] inequality without consistently high growth 
rates.  
 
This policy inflection, including selected elements of neodevelopmentalism in addition to 
the policy ‘tripod’, was successful for a limited time. Approximately 21 million jobs were 
created in Brazil during the 2000s, of which 90 per cent paid less than 1.5 times the 
minimum wage, and 80 per cent were in the formal sector (Pomar 2013). Real average 
earnings rose 70 per cent between 2003 and 2014, while informality declined by 11 p.p. 
and unemployment by 3 p.p. (see Table 2). In contrast, the number of jobs paying more 
than 5 times the minimum wage declined sharply (Saad-Filho 2014). These developments 
had immediate distributional implications. For example, the wage share fell from 50 per 
cent of national income, in 1980, to 36 per cent in the early 2000s; it subsequently 
recovered to reach 50 per cent in 2011 (Pochmann 2011: 16, Pomar 2013: 42).  
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Table 2 – Brazil: Key labour market indicators, 2001-2014 
Year 
Index of 
total 
employme
nt  
Unemployment 
rate (%) 
Index of real 
minimum wage  
Index of average 
earnings from the 
main job 
Informality rate 
(%) 
2001 100.0 10.1 100.0 100.0 58.3 
2002 103.4 9.9 96.8 97.1 58.4 
2003 104.6 10.5 105.3 90.9 57.6 
2004 108.3 9.7 107.5 91.4 56.6 
2005 110.8 10.2 118.0 95.4 55.5 
2006 113.2 9.2 133.9 103.2 54.3 
2007 115.1 8.9 138.3 106.8 53.4 
2008 118.6 7.8 141.8 109.6 50.9 
2009 119.6 9.1 152.6 112.2 50.4 
2010 – – 157.2 – – 
2011 121.4 7.3 158.4 123.8 47.1 
2012 123.5 6.7 170.2 131.6 46.3 
2013 123.7 7.1 175.8 144.6 45.4 
2014 127.1 7.5 176.7 154.8 46.5 
Source: Ipeadata.gov.br. 
 
Key to these progressive outcomes was a more aggressive minimum wage policy, which 
raised it by 27 per cent in real terms between 2006 and 2012 (see Table 2). This uplift 
had a considerable impact on the lower segments of the labour market, since 73 per cent 
of formal employees and 47 per cent of informal workers and the self-employed earned 
between 1 and 3 times the minimum wage in 2005 (by 2011, those numbers had risen to 
79 per cent and 49 per cent).2  
 
The impact of the minimum wage extends well beyond the labour market, as it often 
determines pensions, social security and unemployment benefits. For example, between 
2002 and 2010, government transfers to households rose by almost 2 p.p. of GDP; 40 per 
cent of this increase can be attributed directly to the minimum wage policy (IPEA 2010: 
104-109). The federal income transfer programmes also expanded significantly, with the 
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number of beneficiaries rising from 14.5 million to 24.4 million between 1995 and 2011; 
social spending rose by nearly 200 per cent in real terms during this period, climbing 
from 11.0 to 16.2 per cent of GDP (Saad-Filho 2015).  
 
The growth of aggregate demand was also fuelled by personal debt, which increased from 
18 per cent of disposable income, in January 2005, to 42 per cent, in December 2011 
(BCB 2016). Credit growth was due both to higher debt for households that were already 
included in the financial sector, and the extension of loans to new consumers. For 
example, the share of households earning up to 3 minimum wages with at least one credit 
card increased from 15 to 25 per cent between 2005 and 2010; for those with incomes 
between 3 and 5 minimum wages, card use rose from 30 to 43 per cent (Lavinas 2015).  
 
The government also capitalised the Brazilian development bank, BNDES, which 
provided loans and other financial support especially to large domestic firms (‘national 
champions’). Those included Itaú and Bradesco (banking), Embraer (aviation), Odebrecht 
(construction), Vale (mining), Inbev (beverages), Gerdau (steel) and Friboi and Brazil 
Foods (processed foods) (Boito Jr 2012). In 2007, the federal government launched a 
‘growth acceleration programme’ focusing on investments in infrastructure, followed by 
a large housing programme. It also provided additional funding for education, health and 
other public services, and expanded the civil service, aiming to recover policy-making 
capacity and reduce subcontracting. 
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Rising public expenditures, transfers and investment had no adverse macroeconomic 
implications. They were funded almost entirely by the additional tax revenues and social 
security contributions due to faster growth, the expansion and formalisation of 
employment, and rising exports. The average primary fiscal surplus fell only marginally 
between 2003 and 2008, when it reached 2.3 per cent of GDP, while the domestic public 
debt declined from 55 per cent of GDP, in 2002, to 40 per cent in 2010 (Morais and Saad-
Filho 2012).  
 
Higher minimum wages and transfers, credit, fiscal activism and booming exports 
sustained a virtuous circle of growth and distribution that drove an unprecedented 
reduction in poverty and inequality during the PT administrations. Brazil had 60 million 
poor people in 1993 (41 per cent of the population), and the same number in 2003 (35 per 
cent). Poverty fell rapidly, to under 30 million people (15 per cent of the population) in 
2012.3 In turn, the Gini coefficient of household per capita income, which hovered under 
0.60 between the mid-1970s and 2001, declined to 0.53 in 2012. Approximately 55 per 
cent of its decline was due to labour market improvements, 22 per cent to state pensions, 
and 17 per cent to other income transfer programmes, such as the conditional cash 
transfer scheme Programa Bolsa Famíla (Family Benefit Programme, PBF) (Hoffmann 
2013). However, tax returns data suggest higher inequality than the household surveys, 
smaller distributional improvements, and stability in the top incomes. For example, the 
top 0.1 per cent appropriated around 10 per cent of national income in the entire period 
between 2006 and 2011, while the top 1 per cent captured 25 per cent of national income. 
The combination of tax returns with household surveys suggests that the Gini coefficient 
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of household per capita income remained stable around 0.69 between 2006 and 2012, 
largely because of the contribution of capital-related income sources (mainly profits and 
interest), which, in Brazil, are not subject to taxation (Gobetti and Orair 2016a, 2016b, 
Medeiros, Souza, and Castro 2015a, 2015b).  
 
In other words, during the PT administrations there was redistribution of income through 
expanded access to public pensions, conditional cash transfers and more equal earnings in 
the labour market, while the profound inequalities in capital income were preserved. As 
the incomes of the poorest rose, poverty declined, and wages became less unequal; in the 
meantime, the rich preserved their income share. This implies that, first, the process of 
distribution of income through wages and transfers would inevitably be limited. Second, 
the middle class would be squeezed by the ability of the rich to maintain their position, 
the improvement in the lot of the poor, and the scarcity of well-paid jobs. Third, 
distributional improvements would raise costs in the urban services sector, which is 
labour-intensive and where most low-wage employment is concentrated, triggering 
inflationary pressures affecting disproportionately the middle class, as a heavy net buyer 
of those services. 
 
The internalisation of the sources of growth during Lula’s administration can be 
explained by the macroeconomic policy change implemented in 2006, and the 
deterioration of Brazil’s current account in the wake of the global economic crisis starting 
in 2008. Between 2006 and 2011, exports contributed only 5.6 per cent of GDP growth 
(an average of 0.2 points per year). Their role was dwarfed by government consumption 
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(11.8 per cent, or 0.5 points), private investment (23.3 per cent, or 1.0 points) and, 
especially, private consumption (59.2 per cent of growth, or 2.6 points per year) (see 
Table 1 and Santos et al. 2012 and Santos, Modenesi, et al. 2016). The volatility and 
limited influence of investment helps to explain why the Brazilian growth spurt never 
became a sustained cycle of accumulation. Finally, even though exports and capital 
inflows did not influence growth very significantly, they helped to displace the balance-
of-payments constraint: Brazil’s foreign currency reserves rose from US$54 billion, in 
2005, to US$379 billion, in 2012, or from 6.1 to 16.8 per cent of GDP (BCB 2016). 
 
In summary, the growth process under Lula was driven initially by exports and, 
subsequently, by public policies that lifted the lowest incomes, especially rising 
minimum wages and transfer programmes, supported by personal credit; in contrast, 
exports gradually lost relevance, and government spending and autonomous private 
investment were always secondary. Faster growth increased the demand for low-skilled 
labour, further lifting incomes through labour scarcities and the formalisation of labour, 
and reinforcing the links between growth and distribution (Rugitsky 2016). High 
commodity prices and abundant international liquidity alleviated the balance-of-payments 
constraint to growth, as the trade balance remained positive for most of the period, and 
there were no currency crises. Finally, the appreciation of the domestic currency helped 
to reduce inflation. In other words, the Lula administration delivered growth and 
distribution through a limited and non-confrontational set of income-based policies that, 
under favourable external conditions, could be sustained by market processes. However, 
private investment failed to pick up, no significant transformations took place in the 
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productive structure, public investment was insufficient to modernise the country’s 
infrastructure, and there was no attempt to address the inequalities in the distribution of 
assets, or even to tax the highest incomes. 
 
Throughout this period, the political opposition to the PT was led by the PSDB, which 
had occupied the government between 1994 and 2002. The PSDB gradually lost much of 
its support because of its track record including questionable privatisations, low 
employment creation, extensive informalisation of labour and the mishandling of the 
currency in the late 1990s, leading the party to become associated with the exchange rate 
crisis of 1999 (see Saad-Filho and Mollo 2001). In contrast, the PT managed to put 
together a large coalition including important fractions of capital and the country’s largest 
trade unions and social movements (Boito Jr and Saad-Filho 2016). Nevertheless, the 
fragmentation of the political system, especially in Congress, permanently impaired the 
PT administrations, since the party never came close to a majority either in the Chamber 
of Deputies or in the Senate (the PT and its reliable allies never controlled more than one-
third of seats; see Albuquerque 2016). In these circumstances, it became essential to 
cultivate alliances with assorted political parties that controlled around 40 per cent of 
seats in Congress. Ultimately, the decision to manage these alliances, instead of seeking 
to mobilise extra-parliamentary forces in order to transform the political system, would 
become a decisive factor in the downfall of the PT’s administrations. 
 
 
The Limits of Pragmatism 
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Lula’s approval ratings hit record levels as the economy expanded rapidly, at least in 
comparison to the semi-stagnation in the previous two decades, and the condition of the 
poor improved. He was not only re-elected in 2006, but also secured the election of his 
chosen successor, in 2010: Dilma Rousseff, his former Minister of Mining and Energy 
and, later, Chief of Staff. However, the limitations of the PT’s pragmatic policies would 
soon block further gains in growth and distribution; eventually, those limitations would 
destroy Rousseff’s administration. 
 
Brazil’s manufacturing sector began to contract in the early 1980s. By the mid-1990s, the 
country showed signs of deindustrialisation due to persistently high interest rates, 
continuing currency overvaluation and incoherent industrial policies (Nassif, Feijó, and 
Araújo 2015). Mining and agribusiness expanded at the same time, leading to the 
reprimarisation of the economy, accompanied by declining competitiveness, sluggish 
GDP growth, and a deteriorating pattern of employment. These developments also 
created structural supply problems and made export income highly dependent on global 
commodity prices.  
 
The country’s current account and trade surpluses peaked in 2006, at US$13 billion and 
US$45 billion, respectively, but they deteriorated steadily afterwards. A solvency 
problem was avoided only because the country received unprecedented inflows of foreign 
capital, partly because of the fortuitous programmes of quantitative easing in the USA, 
UK, EU and Japan. Although Brazil’s trade in goods remained in surplus until 2013, the 
growth in export revenues after 2006 was almost entirely due to increases in the prices of 
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its exportables, , as the volume of goods sold remained stationary. In contrast, the 
volumes of imports almost doubled. Inevitably, the country’s current account deteriorated 
since 2007, reaching a deficit of US$100 billion in 2014 (4.3 per cent of GDP). The 
deficit decreased only in 2015, as the Brazilian currency declined in value, and the 
economy collapsed into its worst ever crisis.  
 
The persistent overvaluation of the Brazilian real derived from the key role of the 
exchange rate in the neoliberal strategy of inflation control and international integration, 
which had been imposed in the early 1990s. This strategy was maintained by the PT 
governments. The average exchange rate appreciated from R$3.08 per dollar, in 2003, to 
only R$1.67 per dollar, in 2011. The real later declined to R$2.25 per dollar in 2013. 
However, this depreciation raised import prices in the domestic market, that led the rate 
of inflation to break through the ‘ceiling’ of the Central Bank’s target range of 2.5-6.5 per 
cent per annum (Braga 2015; Giovannetti and Carvalho 2015; Santos, Amitrano, et al. 
2016). At that point, the government’s strategy reached an impasse: continuing attempts 
to control inflation through high interest rates and an overvalued exchange rate would 
raise the current account deficit and worsen the economic slowdown. In contrast, 
containing wages and transfers in order to cut aggregate demand would stall both growth 
and redistribution. The government opted, instead, for subsidies and administrative price 
controls, despite their limited effectiveness and high fiscal costs. 
 
It can be concluded that the growth spurt under the PT administrations was based on the 
expansion of domestic demand. However, domestic demand-led growth accompanied by 
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low investment and lagging productivity growth created unsustainable pressures on the 
balance of payments. Given the continuing global crisis, Brazil’s export earnings were 
limited both in terms of quantity and in terms of its prices. These limitations could be 
addressed, in part, by a devaluation of the currency, but this would raise inflation, which 
was already under pressure because of the mounting cost of domestic services. In 
contrast, contractionary macroeconomic policies would stall the PT’s model of growth 
and endanger the government’s political standing. Finally, both consumption and 
investment were constrained by the high level of the interest rates (which fostered 
speculation and the overvaluation of the currency), the hollowing out of the 
manufacturing base (which compromised the balance of payments and created 
undesirable employment patterns), and by tight fiscal rules and the financial restraints 
imposed upon the state-owned enterprises (SOEs, which were consequently prevented 
from investing to improve the quality of urban life). Given these limitations, the economy 
could sustain growth only through an external impulse (unlikely, given the global crisis) 
or a boom in private investment (which was even more improbable). 
 
The Fall of President Dilma Rousseff in Four Movements 
 
First Movement: The Failure of the ‘New Economic Matrix’ 
 
Dilma Rousseff became President in January 2011. Her administration was committed to 
faster growth and distribution based on a stronger neodevelopmentalist agenda, but 
without abandoning the ‘tripod’. Her government introduced a ‘new economic matrix’ 
aiming to support private investment through a better alignment of monetary and 
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exchange rate policies with the country’s industrial policy. This was expected to boost the 
economy’s productivity by supporting the expansion of infrastructure and other key 
economic sectors, lowering production costs, and accelerating the development of 
strategic production chains, especially around oil and other essential inputs. In doing this, 
the government was hoping to limit the country’s rising current account deficit. Real 
interest rates were cut to their lowest level in two decades, and the administration offered 
generous tax rebates to stimulate production and reduce inflation. They also strong-armed 
the private operators into reducing electricity prices, reduced national insurance 
contributions and other labour costs, and capitalised the Brazilian Development Bank 
(BNDES), that became the largest development bank in the world. Finally, the 
government sought to attract private investment into infrastructure through public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) offering highly advantageous conditions for the investors. 
 
Despite these policies and incentives, private investment remained stubbornly low and 
never became the main driver of economic growth. Persistently low investment and the 
government’s increasingly contractionary fiscal policy reduced the GDP growth rate from 
7.5 per cent, in 2010, to only 1.9, in 2012 (Carvalho and Rugitsky 2015, Serrano and 
Summa 2015). In this period, the subsidies cost 0.2 per cent of GDP, rising by another 
0.5 per cent by 2015, while public investment fell by 0.5 per cent of GDP, and the 
primary fiscal surplus rose by 1.1 per cent of GDP.  
 
Fiscal austerity was justified by the need to gain ‘credibility’ in order to lure private 
investment, and by the need to compensate the (expected) expansionary impact of the 
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reduction in interest rates. However, since the multiplier effect of public investment is 
much higher than the expansionary impact of the subsidies (that is, economic activity 
responds much more strongly to additional government investment than to the 
subsidisation of private economic activity), the net effect of the government’s policies 
was sharply contractionary (Orair, Siqueira, and Gobetti 2016: 17). Finally, the external 
sector failed to recover despite the devaluation of the real, because of the continuing 
global turbulence, the crisis in the Eurozone, and the depression in international 
commodity prices. 
 
Falling growth rates and rising inflation increasingly undermined the government’s 
political legitimacy. Recognising the failure of its attempt to reduce interest rates, the 
Central Bank resumed its commitment to the neoliberal policy tripod, and interest rates 
started rising again in 2013. At the same time, the Ministry of Finance announced further 
restrictions in public spending, which compounded the country’s economic decline. Even 
though Brazil’s neodevelopmentalist experience was closed, there were still profits to be 
made: Eike Batista, who was one of Brazil’s wealthiest entrepreneurs before his 
spectacular downfall in 2017, gloated that the PPPs offered business a ‘happiness kit’ 
(Alves 2012). The ‘new economic matrix’ was so closely aligned with the demands of 
domestic capital that it was even called the ‘FIESP [Industrial Federation of the State of 
São Paulo] agenda’, after the economic programme of the country’s most powerful 
business organisation (FIESP et al. 2011, see also Singer 2015). 
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Even though the ‘FIESP agenda’ expressed the demands of important fractions of capital, 
it did not support a consistent economic policy. It brought large fiscal costs through the 
provision of a plethora of subsidies, without any conditions attached either in terms of 
investments or performance. Quite the contrary: inflation rose, the current account deficit 
increased, private investment fell, and GDP growth tumbled. Shockingly, many 
businesspeople started complaining about ‘excessive’ state intervention and ‘lack of 
access’ to a government that was doggedly following capital’s own programme. As the 
economy increasingly ground to a halt, the government shifted more and more frantically 
towards the economic orthodoxy, aiming to bring large capital back on board. However, 
orthodox neoliberal policies led aggregate demand, employment growth and distribution 
to stall which, in turn, eroded the PT’s base of support among the workers and the poor. 
The win-win class conciliation scenario of the 2000s could no longer be maintained. 
Under these adverse circumstances, the pursuit of political pragmatism fed economic 
decline and led the government into a growing political isolation.  
 
Second Movement: Snubbing the Streets 
 
On 6 June 2013, the radical left Free Fare Movement (Movimento Passe Livre, MPL) led 
a small demonstration demanding the reversal of a public transport fare increase in São 
Paulo. The demonstration was attacked by the police, and several arrests were made. The 
MPL returned in the following days, and the police responded brutally, beating 
demonstrators and passers-by. The movement escalated and spread nationwide, leading to 
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the largest protests in Brazil for a generation (Moraes et al. 2014, Saad-Filho 2013, Saad-
Filho and Morais 2014, Singer 2014). 
 
The protestors, including students, left-wing activists, organised professional categories, 
informal workers, neighbourhood associations, and fractions of the upper middle class, 
expressed a wide range of (often contradictory) demands across public service provision, 
especially transport, health and education, and broader issues of governance, focusing on 
corruption, taxation, privatisation and the administration of justice.4  
 
The PT could have responded creatively to those demands, channelling them selectively 
into the government’s own agenda. However, this became impossible under the party’s 
pragmatic strategy for two reasons. First, faltering economic performance had reduced 
state capacity to reconcile interests through public spending, especially around 
investment in urban infrastructure, where transformative projects have high costs, long 
lags, intractable environmental implications and uncertain political rewards. Second, the 
PT was politically exhausted, as it struggled to maintain a working majority in Congress 
through increasingly unstable alliances and incoherent deals with controversial 
politicians. The party’s acrobatics during this period did untold damage to the 
government’s reputation and its mass support. 
 
Instead of recognising the rapidly shifting political atmosphere in the country, the PT 
persisted with its pragmatic approach to ‘politics as usual’. At the tail end of the 
demonstrations, the government proposed a reform of the Constitution to fix Brazil’s 
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dysfunctional political system. When the idea was summarily shot down by an 
emboldened opposition, including some of the government’s erstwhile allies, Dilma 
Rousseff was immobilised. In the meantime, the PT and its mass organisations were 
unable to channel the demonstrations towards progressive ends. This failure marked their 
disconnection from the majority of the population, the end of the PT’s political 
hegemony, and the terminal paralysis of Rousseff’s administration. The PT was no longer 
a transformative political force, and the government was now a sitting duck. 
 
Third Movement: The Political Turnaround 
 
Dilma Rousseff was elected President in 2010, with a 56-44 per cent majority against the 
PSDB opposition candidate. She was re-elected in 2014 with a diminished but convincing 
majority of 52-48 per cent, a difference of 3.5 million votes. However, Dilma’s triumph 
coincided with the rapid deterioration of the economy. GDP growth rates, which had 
been declining since 2010, reached zero that year, and the distributional improvements 
that had legitimised the PT administrations had ceased. Economic growth in the previous 
years, and insufficient investment in infrastructure because of fiscal and other constraints, 
triggered mounting demands and a feeling of deterioration in public service provision, 
symbolised by the transport crisis, in 2013, and the scarcity of water and the rising 
electricity costs in 2014-15. 
 
During the 2014 electoral campaign the PT moved sharply to the left, claiming that the 
PSDB would impose harsh neoliberal policies, overturn labour rights, and reverse the 
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social and economic achievements of the previous administrations. In contrast, the PT 
offered faster growth and continuing improvements in wages, benefits, employment and 
social rights.  
 
That ‘left turn’ was merely rhetorical. Having won the election, and facing a rabidly 
hostile media and the most right-wing Congress in decades, the PT reverted to 
pragmatism, and desperately sought to placate the opposition. Rousseff dismissed the 
long-serving neodevelopmentalist Minister of Finance Guido Mantega, and appointed 
Joaquim Levy, a neoliberal banker chosen by Bradesco, one of the country’s largest 
financial conglomerates. He was tasked with implementing a harsh austerity programme 
to reduce the fiscal deficit, restore the government’s ‘credibility’ and kick-start the 
elusive cycle of growth led by private investment. Public spending, investment and 
services were cut, followed by unemployment benefits and pensions, just as the PT 
suggested the opposition would have done if the PSDB had won the election. 
 
Despite this turnaround, Dilma and the PT were unable to secure the support of capital or 
the upper middle class, or stem the vitriolic attacks of the mainstream media; yet, they 
fatally alienated their own base of support in the formal and informal working class and 
the social movements, as the fiscal cuts bit and the economy tailspinned because of the 
lack of demand. It was impossible for the government to cut its way to growth, and their 
policies were insufficient to secure the support of any major constituency: each 
concession was met by bitter opposition and escalating demands. At that stage, political 
pragmatism and attempts to do ‘deals’ with the opposition had become counter-
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productive. With each round of cuts and concessions, more allies were lost. The 
haemorrhage had become uncontrollable. 
 
Fourth Movement: The Coup d’État 
 
The right-wing opposition to the PT had been rudderless for years. The PSDB had neither 
plausible ideas nor a positive reputation, since its policies were directly responsible for 
the 1999 economic crisis, and the other political parties were largely devoid of ideology; 
they were mainly tools to capture public resources. In the mid-2000s, the situation 
became so desperate that the mainstream media openly took the mantle of opposition, 
driving the anti-PT agenda (Farah 2010, LEMEP 2016). 
 
Corruption was the ideal pretext to destroy the PT. During the 1990s, the PT had thrived 
in opposition, presenting itself as the only honest party in Brazil. This strategy worked, 
but it contained a lethal contradiction: in order to win expensive elections with a 
moderate platform, manage local governments and sustain a majority in the legislature, 
through sprawling coalitions underpinned by case-by-case deals, the PT would have to 
get its hands dirty. Yet the party succeeded for several years, winning elections at all 
levels. As the PT prospered and federal power came within its grasp, the party became 
increasingly concerned with ‘governance’ and ‘stability’, and started to avoid 
confrontations with current, prospective, potential or necessary allies, which implied the 
abandonment of earlier commitments to reform campaign finance, the media and 
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electoral law, increase the influence of the workers in their place of employment, and 
democratise the SOEs. 
 
In 2005, Lula’s administration was severely destabilised by the mensalão scandal, which 
derived from unproven allegations that the government was paying members of Congress 
a monthly stipend in exchange for their votes. In 2014, the Lava Jato (carwash) scandal 
unveiled an extraordinary tale of bribery, plunder of public assets and funding for all 
major political parties, drawing upon the state oil company Petrobras and its suppliers in 
the oil, shipbuilding and construction industries. Several politicians and many of Brazil’s 
wealthiest businessmen were imprisoned; their plea bargains ensnared others, in a never-
ending cycle of political destruction targeting primarily the PT. 
 
In the meantime, the opposition started proceedings to impeach President Rousseff 
because of alleged irregularities in government spending (no personal gain was 
suggested). The PT and other left parties and social movements denounced the 
impeachment as a coup, given the insignificance of the accusations: at best, they hinged 
on a technicality; at worst, they would implicate most state governors as well as Dilma’s 
predecessors. In the melee, the economic crisis, rising unemployment, gargantuan 
corruption and a torrent of political scandals became completely enmeshed, while the 
mainstream media trumpeted daily that the PT was at the centre of a web of thievery 
without precedent, with Lula and Dilma robbing the Republic during the day while, at 
night, they conspired to turn Brazil into a satellite of Venezuela. 
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Despite the mounting threats, the PT and the left reacted weakly and excruciatingly 
slowly. Most social movements had been captured by the PT administrations or 
demobilised as part of the PT’s effort to win elections and govern by the rules; the far left 
remained small and scattered and, since it had always defined itself in opposition to the 
PT, found it difficult to support Dilma Rousseff. Finally, the upper middle class and the 
media had become implacably hostile to the left since 2013, making it harder to mobilise 
the population to support Dilma’s democratic mandate. 
 
At certain moments it appeared that the PT might wake up to the imperative of mass 
resistance. For example, after he was spectacularly questioned as part of the Lava Jato 
investigations, in March 2016, former President Lula said that PT must stand up and 
confront the coup in the streets, and he would travel around the country doing just that. 
Yet Lula immediately retreated into secretive conversations with fellow politicians, and 
would rarely be seen in public. Dilma Rousseff also refused to take part in 
demonstrations supporting her own mandate, allegedly to avoid being associated with 
‘radicals’ (Dias 2016). It soon became apparent that the PT would not fight even against a 
judicial-parliamentary coup d’état aiming to eject it from power and, eventually, 
dismantle the party itself. The outcome was inevitable: Dilma Rousseff was removed 
from office on 31 August 2016 and, in the local elections in October, the PT suffered a 
crushing defeat.  
 
Conclusion 
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The coup against President Dilma Rousseff was the culmination of the deepest crisis in 
Brazil in fifty years. The economy offers a picture of utter desolation. The country’s GDP 
stagnated in 2014, contracted by 3.8 per cent in 2015, and slumped again in 2016, 
wrecking the gains achieved under the PT. The fiscal deficit remains uncontrolled, 
unemployment has reached double digits and continues to mount, and several ‘national 
champions’ have virtually collapsed. The Constitution is in shreds. Most political leaders 
and their parties are implicated in a never-ending array of scandals, Congress is 
demoralised, the media tries to rule the country, the judicial system is dangerously over-
reaching as it, too, tries to become the dominant power in the Republic, and the 
institutions of the state are severely disorganised. Policymaking has become erratic. 
 
This legal, political and economic turmoil suggests that, first, given the PT’s 
determination to pursue the pragmatic path of least resistance, its achievements depended 
strictly on a favourable global economic environment. Second, when the PT pushed for 
more heterodox policies, it achieved short-term successes but its efforts were hampered 
by the country’s external dependence, the party’s residual attachment to neoliberalism, 
and its reluctance to push for a transformation of the political system. Third, pragmatism 
disarmed the PT against the unremitting opposition of the media, the neoliberal interests 
and the upper middle class. It is, then, apparent that more significant achievements in 
growth, poverty alleviation and distribution, and the recomposition of the country’s 
economic fabric, required more ambitious policy changes supporting a break with the 
limitations imposed by neoliberalism. These policies could include the abolition of the 
neoliberal ‘policy tripod’, lower interest rates and exchange rates, more aggressive 
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industrial, financial and capital account policies, the restoration of key production chains, 
especially in medium and high-technology sectors producing tradables, large investments 
in infrastructure and public goods and services, and greater improvements in the labour 
market (Barbosa Filho 2015; Barboza 2015). In turn, the distribution of income and 
assets would require a comprehensive reform of property and taxation addressing the 
structural inequalities between rich and poor, and between capital and labour. 
 
Instead of recognising the limits of pragmatism, the PT chose to ignore them and stick to 
the path of least resistance on the economic, social and political domains. There was no 
meaningful attempt to reform the Constitution, the state or the political system, or 
transform the country’s economic structure or its pattern of international integration, even 
under unprecedentedly favourable conditions including mass support, rapid growth, 
distributional improvements and balance of payments stability. The PT governments 
introduced no new economic rights, and even the party’s flagship cash transfer 
programme, PBF, remains vulnerable. Instead, the PT administrations limited their 
aspirations to the ‘reformism lite’ permitted by their unwieldy alliances at the top. This 
worked well while circumstances were favourable. However, the scope for compromise 
solutions where (almost) everyone won eventually fizzled out. 
 
In examining the paths not taken by the PT, timing is of the essence. Once the PT had 
committed itself to playing by the rules, it was bound to pursue a non-confrontational 
approach both in order to win the 2002 elections and, initially, when in power. However, 
as the party achieved increasing successes and Lula’s popularity soared, the political 
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space was created to reform the political system, media ownership, the distribution of 
assets and the economic structure. Popular mobilisations around these demands could 
have cemented the party’s mass base of support. Inevitably, they would also have 
attracted the wrath of powerful interests but, at least, in this case the PT would have had 
the wherewithal to fight for what it had traditionally stood for. Instead, the PT chose to 
trap itself into a corner and watch as its supporters, by and large, failed to come to the 
rescue in the party’s hour of need. 
 
Instead, as it failed to recognise the changes in the external and the domestic 
environment, the Rousseff administration adopted increasingly erratic policies. Initially, 
it doubled its bets on neodevelopmentalism. When they seemed to fail, the government 
intervened randomly, offering subsidies, PPP deals and lower taxes and energy prices, to 
no avail. Private investment tapered off, the public finances deteriorated, inflation crept 
up and GDP growth sagged. The PT then turned towards neoliberalism, abandoning its 
previous achievements and overseeing the demolition of its own political base of support. 
At every step, and regardless of the mounting wrath of the opposition, the PT remained 
wedded to a pragmatic and non-confrontational strategy. 
 
The PT was not destroyed for being too leftist. Instead, its administration imploded 
because of the party’s attachment to pragmatism even when it had become 
counterproductive, and because of their attempt to keep triangulating towards a political 
centre that was collapsing into the far right. After the opposition chose the route of 
intransigence and conflict, and with the media and the judiciary in hot pursuit, no amount 
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of concessions at the top could have kept the PT in power. Yet the party refused to 
consider the possibility of confrontation. The implementation of neoliberal austerity 
policies after the 2014 elections, in flagrant contradiction with its campaign promises, 
destroyed the credibility of the PT, and left the party vulnerable to attack under the 
pretexts of corruption, conspiracy to subvert the Constitution, financial malfeasance, and 
much else. The PT lost its supporters, and did not gain any allies. Pragmatism had run its 
course.  
 
The experience of the PT suggests that transformative projects in Brazil are bound to face 
escalating resistance. Their form, effectiveness, and impact on the alliances supporting 
the administration will tend to fluctuate, depending on the government’s response and the 
global environment, making it difficult to plan reformist strategies in detail. However, it 
is clear that the efficacy of pragmatism is limited, and that the cultivation of ever-
widening circles of increasingly unreliable allies can foster instability and political 
paralysis. Instead, the class, political and institutional sources of power must be targeted 
clearly, openly, and rapidly, in order to mobilise the groups with the most to gain, 
especially the urban poor. The PT failed to do this; the party lost and it has been heavily 
damaged. It is unlikely that the PT itself will cease to exist, given its deep roots in 
Brazilian society, but its role as a force for progressive change has been severely 
curtailed. Brazil will pay a heavy price for the PT’s flawed political strategy for many 
years to come. 
  
This is the accepted version of an article published by Sage in Latin American Perspectives, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X18805093 
31 
 
References 
 
Albuquerque, Eduardo da Motta 
2016 A historic turning point in Brazil. International Socialism, 151, 17-36. 
Alves, Cida 
2012 "É um kit felicidade para o Brasil", diz Eike Batista. Exame, 15/08/2012. 
http://exame.abril.com.br/economia/e-um-kit-felicidade-para-o-brasil-diz-eike-
batista/ (Accessed 30/11/2016). 
Arestis, Philip, and Alfredo Saad-Filho 
2007 Political economy of Brazil: recent economic performance. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Barbosa Filho, Nelson 
2015 "O desafio macroeconômico de 2015-2018." Revista de Economia Política 
35:403-425. 
Barboza, Ricardo de Menezes 
2015 "Taxa de juros e mecanismos de transmissão da política monetária no 
Brasil." Revista de Economia Política 35 (1):133-155. 
BCB 
2016 Séries Temporais. SGS. https://www3.bcb.gov.br/sgspub/ (Accessed 
21/10/2016). 
Boito Jr, Armando 
2012 "Governos Lula: a Nova Burguesia Nacional no Poder." In Política e classes 
sociais no Brasil dos anos 2000, edited by Armando Boito Jr and Andréia Galvão. 
São Paulo: Alameda. 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Sage in Latin American Perspectives, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X18805093 
32 
 
Boito Jr, Armando and Alfredo Saad-Filho 
2016 State, State Institutions, and Political Power in Brazil. Latin American 
Perspectives, 43(2), 190-206. 
Braga, Julia de Medeiros 
2015 "A inflação brasileira na década de 2000 e a importância das políticas não 
monetárias de controle." Economia e Sociedade 22 (3):697-727. 
Bresser-Pereira, Luiz Carlos 
2005 "Macroeconomia Pós-Plano Real: As Relações Básicas." In Novo-
desenvolvimentismo: um projeto nacional de crescimento com eqüidade social, 
edited by João Sicsú, Luiz Fernando de Paula and Renault Michel. Barueri: 
Manole. 
Carvalho, Laura, and Fernando Rugitsky 
2015 "Growth and distribution in Brazil the 21st century: revisiting the wage-led 
versus profit-led debate." FEA/USP Working Paper Series 2015 (25):1-21. 
CEDLAS, and The World Bank 
2016 SEDLAC. http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/eng/ (Accessed 21/10/2016). 
Corrêa, Vanessa Petrelli, and Cláudio Hamilton Matos Santos 
2013 "Modelo de crescimento brasileiro e mudança estrutural – avanços e 
limites." In Padrão de acumulação e desenvolvimento brasileiro, edited by 
Vanessa Petrelli Corrêa, 17-55. São Paulo: Fundação Perseu Abramo. 
Dias, Marina  
2016 Dilma desiste de ir a ato contra Temer para evitar 'discursos radicais. Folha 
de São Paulo, 09/06/2016. 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Sage in Latin American Perspectives, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X18805093 
33 
 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/06/1780069-dilma-desiste-de-ir-a-ato-
contra-temer-para-evitar-discursos-radicais.shtml (Accessed 30/11/2016). 
Farah, Tatiana 
2010 Entidades de imprensa e Fecomercio estudam ir ao STF contra plano de 
direitos humanos. O Globo, 18/03/2010. 
http://oglobo.globo.com/politica/entidades-de-imprensa-fecomercio-estudam-ir-
ao-stf-contra-plano-de-direitos-humanos-3037045 (Accessed 30/11/2016). 
FIESP, CUT, Sindicato dos Metalúrgicos do ABC, Força Sindical, and Sindicato dos 
Metalúrgicos de São Paulo e Mogi das Cruzes 
2011 Brasil do diálogo, da produção e do emprego: acordo entre trabalhadores e 
empresários pelo futuro da produção e emprego. São Paulo. 
Giovannetti, Luiz Felipe, and Laura Carvalho 
2015 "Distribuição de renda, mudança estrutural e inflação de serviços no Brasil." 
Anais do Encontro da ANPEC 43:1-20. 
Gobetti, Sérgio Wulff, and Rodrigo O. Orair 
2016a "Progressividade tributária: a agenda negligenciada." Textos para 
discussão do IPEA 2190:1-60. 
2016b "Tributação e distribuição da renda no Brasil: novas evidências a partir das 
declarações tributárias das pessoas físicas." IPC-IG Working Papers 136:1-23. 
Hoffmann, Rodolfo 
2013 "Transferências de Renda e Desigualdade no Brasil (1995-2011)." In 
Programa Bolsa Família: uma década de inclusão e cidadania, edited by Tereza 
Campello and Marcelo Neri, 207-216. Brasília: IPEA. 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Sage in Latin American Perspectives, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X18805093 
34 
 
IPEA 
2010 Brasil em Desenvolvimento: Estado, Planejamento e Políticas Públicas, vol. 
I. Brasília: IPEA. 
Lavinas, Lena 
2015 "A financeirização da política social: o caso brasileiro." Politika 2:35-51. 
LEMEP 
2016 "Manchetômetro." Accessed 30/11/2016. 
http://www.manchetometro.com.br. 
Medeiros, Marcelo, Pedro H. G. Ferreira de Souza, and Fábio Ávila de Castro 
2015a "O topo da distribuição de renda no Brasil: primeiras estimativas com 
dados tributários e comparação com pesquisas domiciliares (2006-2012)." Dados 
58:7-36. 
2015b. "The stability of income inequality in Brazil, 2006-2012: an estimate using 
income tax data and household surveys." Ciência & Saúde Coletiva 20:971-986. 
Moraes, Alana, Bernardo Gutiérrez, Henrique Parra, Hugo Albuquerque, Jean Tible, and 
Salvador Schavelzon, eds.  
2014 Junho: potência das ruas e das redes. São Paulo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 
(FES) Brasil. 
Morais, Lecio, and Alfredo Saad-Filho 
2012 "Neo-Developmentalism and the Challenges of Economic Policy-Making 
under Dilma Rousseff." Critical Sociology 38 (6):789-798. 
Nassif, André, Carmem A. Feijó, and Eliane C. Araújo 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Sage in Latin American Perspectives, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X18805093 
35 
 
2015 "Structural change and economic development: is Brazil catching up or 
falling behind?" Cambridge Journal of Economics 39 (5):1307-1332. 
Orair, Rodrigo, Fernando de Faria Siqueira, and Sérgio Wulff Gobetti 
2016 Política Fiscal e Ciclo Econômico: uma análise baseada em multiplicadores 
do gasto público. Prêmio do Tesouro Nacional 2016: 1-76. 
https://www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br/documents/10180/558095/2o-lugar-rodrigo-
octavio-orair-086.pdf (Accessed 21/11/2016). 
Pochmann, Marcio 
2011 "Políticas sociais e padrão de mudanças no Brasil durante o governo Lula." 
SER Social 13 (28):12-40. 
Pomar, Walter 
2013 Debatendo Classes e Luta de Classes no Brasil. FPA discute 1: 5-50. 
novo.fpabramo.org.br/sites/default/files/fpa-discute-01.pdf (Accessed 
10/12/2016). 
Rugitsky, Fernando 
2016 Milagre, miragem, antimilagre: A economia política dos governos Lula e as 
raízes da crise atual. Fevereiro 9. 
http://www.revistafevereiro.com/pag.php?r=09&t=03 (Accessed 20/10/2016). 
Saad-Filho, Alfredo 
2013 "Mass Protests under ‘Left Neoliberalism’: Brazil, June-July 2013." Critical 
Sociology 39 (5):657-669. 
2014 "Brazil: Development Strategies and Social Change From Import-
Substitution to the “Events of June”." Studies in Political Economy 94 (1):3-29. 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Sage in Latin American Perspectives, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X18805093 
36 
 
2015. "Social Policy for Neoliberalism: The Bolsa Família Programme in Brazil." 
Development and Change 46 (6):1227-1252. 
Saad-Filho, Alfredo, and Maria de Lourdes Rollemberg Mollo 
2001 "Monetary Policy and Inflation in Brazil, 1972-1998." Brazilian Journal of 
Political Economy 82:24-42. 
Saad-Filho, Alfredo, and Lecio Morais 
2014 "Mass Protests: Brazilian Spring or Brazilian Malaise." In Socialist Register, 
edited by Leo Panitch, Greg Albo and Vivek Chibber, 227-246. London: Merlin 
Press. 
Santos, Cláudio Hamilton Matos, Cláudio Roberto Amitrano, Manoel Carlos C. Pires, 
Sandro Cachet Carvalho, Ennio Ferreira, Fernando Henrique de Araújo Esteves, Kolai 
Zagbai Joel Yannick, and Lucikelly dos Santos Lima 
2016 "A natureza da inflação de serviços no Brasil: 1999-2014." Textos para 
discussão do IPEA 2169:1-48. 
Santos, Cláudio Hamilton Matos, André De Melo Modenesi, Gabriel Squeff, Lucas 
Vasconcelos, Mônica Mora, Thais Fernandes, Thiago Moraes, Ricardo Summa, and Julia 
Braga 
2016 "Revisitando a dinâmica trimestral do investimento no Brasil: 1996-2012." 
Revista de Economia Política 36 (1):190-213. 
Santos, Cláudio Hamilton Matos, Rodrigo O. Orair, Sérgio Wulff Gobetti, Alessandra S. 
Ferreira, Wanderson S. Rocha, Hilton L. da Silva, and José M. Britto 
2012 "Estimativas mensais da formação bruta de capital fixo pública no Brasil 
(2002-2010)." Economia Aplicada 16:445-473. 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Sage in Latin American Perspectives, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X18805093 
37 
 
Serrano, Franklin, and Ricardo Summa 
2015 Aggregate Demand and the Slowdown of Brazilian Economic Growth in 
2011-2014. Nova Economia, 25(especial), 803-833. 
Singer, André 
2014 "Rebellion in Brazil: social and political complexion of the June events." 
New Left Review 85:18-37. 
2015 "Cutucando onças com varas curtas: o ensaio desenvolvimentista no 
primeiro mandato de Dilma Rousseff (2011-2014)." Novos Estudos CEBRAP 
102:43-71. 
Souza Júnior, José Ronaldo de Castro 
2016 "Decomposição da Taxa de Crescimento do PIB pelo Lado da Demanda: 
uma Metodologia Alternativa." Carta de conjuntura do IPEA 30:119-132. 
 
 
  
This is the accepted version of an article published by Sage in Latin American Perspectives, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X18805093 
38 
 
Endnotes: 
 
1 All macroeconomic and exchange rate data are from: www.ipeadata.gov.br. 
2 Source: PNAD/IBGE. 
3 The income of the poor in Brazil grew 2.5 times faster than that of the non-poor during 
this period, in a modestly pro-poor growth pattern. This is less than in other Latin 
American countries with left-of-centre governments. Using the international US$ 
2.50/day poverty line, Argentina had a much higher pro-poor growth indicator of 5.5, 
Bolivia of 6.2, and Ecuador of 7.3 between 2007 and 2011 (CEDLAS and The World 
Bank 2016). 
4 Those demands are reviewed in G1 (2013). 
                                                        
